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iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EQUITABLE LIFE & CASUALTY 
INSURANCE CO., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, No. 910246 
v. Priority 16 
DAVID E. ROSS II, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Anno. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant and appellant David E. Ross II states the issues 
presented on appeal in this case as follows (the standard of reviev 
for each of these issues is de novo): 
1. Did David E. Ross II voluntarily and intentionally 
relinquish his equitable right of rescission? 
2. Were there sufficient material facts in the record, 
regardless of whether they were disputed, to establish David E, 
Ross II fs right of rescission under a theory of unilateral mistake^ 
3. Were there sufficient material facts in the record, 
regardless of whether they were disputed, to establish David E, 
Ross II fs breach of contract cause of action, entitling him tc 
either rescission or alternatively to damages? 
4. Were the attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Equitable 
permissible under the language of the contractual documents? 
5. Were the attorneys1 fees and costs awarded to Equitable 
reasonable? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances 
or regulations whose interpretation is determinative in this case. 
The only rule whose interpretation is relevant in this case is 
U.R.C.P. 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
This case involves a dispute over whether David E. Ross II is 
entitled to a Consulting Agreement with a present valu€> of 
$200,000.00 as a result of an agreement reached between David E. 
Ross II and plaintiff and respondent Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Company ("Equitable"). David E. Ross II contends that 
the Consulting Agreement was partial consideration for the stock he 
was transferring to Equitable pursuant to the terms of an Agreement 
dated October 30, 1987, and an Addendum to Agreement. Equitable 
contends that the Consulting Agreement was eliminated during the 
course of the negotiating process. 
On December 4, 1990, Equitablefs Motion for Partial Summary 
2 
Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat. This Motion was limited to the issue of whether David E. 
Ross II, as a matter of law, was not entitled to rescission in this 
case. In part, Equitable argued that David E. Ross II had an 
adequate remedy at law because, if there was indeed a Consultir 
Agreement that was supposed to be part of the deal, everyone knows 
that the Consulting Agreement was valued at $200,000.00. 
Equitablefs position was that if a Consulting Agreement existed, 
David E. Ross II would be able to obtain a judgment for $200,000.0C 
and be made whole.1 Equitable also argued that David E. Ross II 
waived his equitable right of rescission by facilitating the 
closing of the transaction, despite the clear reservation of all of 
his rights in the closing documents. The Court granted Equitablefs 
Motion, leaving the only issue to be tried in the case David E. 
Ross IIfs alternative theory for relief, damages.2 
On December 17, 1990, the case came on for trial before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. After David E. Ross IIfs counsel's 
opening statement, Equitable moved to dismiss the case because the 
Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing held or 
December 4, 1990 at 7 (R. 682) (referred to as the "December 4, 
1990 Trans."); Transcript of Hearing held on December 17, 1990, at 
23 (R. 683) (referred to as the "December 17, 1990 Trans."). 
2
 A copy of the Partial Summary Judgment and Order dat : 
December 17, 1990 (R. 568-70) is attached in the Addendum c: 
Exhibit A. 
3 
facts stated could not, as a matter of law, support David E. Ross 
IIfs claim for damages. The Court also granted that Motion based 
upon Equitable?s argument that David E. Ross II could not establish 
the terms of his Consulting Agreement and dismissed his alternative 
theory of the case, a claim for damages.3 
Equitable then moved for the entry of a judgment against David 
E. Ross II for the attorneys' fees and costs Equitable incurred in 
the case. Despite numerous objections by David E. Ross II, 
including that the contract language did not authorize most of the 
claimed attorneys1 fees and costs, the Court also granted that 
Motion in a wholesale fashion, entering judgment against David E. 
Ross II in the sum of $41,224.17.4 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The controversy between the parties is relatively simple, but 
unfortunately it only can be understood in the setting of a 
relatively complex securities transaction. Simply stated the issue 
is whether David E. Ross II bargained away his rights to a 
Consulting or Retainer Agreement with a present value of 
$200,000.00. If he did not bargain away his rights, the question 
A copy of the Summary Judgment and Order dated January 8, 
1991 (R. 573-77) is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit B. 
4
 A copy of the Order on Motion for Award of Attorneys' 
Fees and Final Judgment dated April 22, 1991 (R. 661-63) is 
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit C. 
4 
becomes whether he voluntarily relinquished them. To answer those 
relatively simple questions, however, it is necessary to understand 
the relationships between the parties, their various stock 
holdings, and the factual course of a relatively complex negotiated 
transaction. 
1. The Individuals Involved in the Transaction. 
Roderick Earl Ross, David E. Ross II fs grandfather, founded 
Equitable.5 Roderick Earl Ross had three sons who became involved 
in the business: Galen Ross, Raymond Ross and David E. Ross.6 
David E. Ross is E. Roderick Rossfs and David E. Ross II fs father.7 
David E. Ross died, leaving half of his stock to his son, E. 
Roderick Ross, one fourth to his son, David E. Ross II, and one 
fourth to his daughter, Betsy Ross Rapps.8 Raymond Ross died, and 
his stock is being held by his son, R. Earl Ross, in trust for 
himself, his four sisters, and his mother.9 
Until he died in 1987, Louis Rich was the President of 
Equitable.10 After that time, R. Earl Ross became Equitable's 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
December 17, 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 30. 
1990 Trans. at 29. 
Chief Executive Officer, and E. Roderick Ross became EquitableTs 
President.11 Up through December 31, 1986, until he was 
terminated, David E. Ross II was general counsel for Equitable.12 
2. The Companies & Securities Involved in the Transaction. 
Insurance Investment Company is the holding company for 
Equitable. It owns 72% of Equitablefs stock.13 National Housing 
was a small related corporation that owned a small amount of 
Equitablefs stock, but primarily held property.14 R. Earl Ross 
and E. Roderick Ross owned approximately 11,308 shares of Insurance 
Investment common stock, constituting approximately 45.2% of the 
outstanding stock.15 Galen Ross, David E. Ross II and Betsy Ross 
Rapps owned approximately 11,802 shares of Insurance Investment 
common stock, constituting approximately 47.2% of the outstanding 
stock.16 The Roderick Earl Ross Memorial Foundation owned the 
remaining 1,883 shares or approximately 7.5% of the Insurance 
Investment common stock.17 As long as these groups remained 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
at 
a t 
a t 
a t 
30 & 4 8 . 
3 0 . 
3 1 . 
3 1 - 3 2 . 
6 
cohesive, the approximate 7,5% of the Insurance Investment common 
stock owned by the Foundation constituted the swing vote which 
established the control of Insurance Investment Company and, 
therefore, the control of Equitable.18 The Foundation decided to 
sell 1,200 shares of the Insurance Investment common stock 
(approximately five percent) to Jim Bowlden, who then transferred 
it to Dorothy Ross, R. Earl Ross's mother.19 The 1,200 shares of 
Insurance Investment common stock held by Dorothy Ross represented 
the swing vote for the control of the Insurance Investment common 
stock. Consequently, R. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross controlled 
the majority of stock in Insurance Investment Company and, 
therefore, controlled Equitable.20 The sale to Jim Bowlden by the 
Foundation destabilized an otherwise stable situation.21 
3. The Negotiations for the Purchase of the Selling Groups1 
Stock. 
As a consequence, in 1986, Galen Ross, Betsy Ross Rapps anc 
David E. Ross II decided to sell their stock to Bennett Leasinc 
Company.22 Galen Ross and Betsy Ross Rapps entered into options, 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
a t 
at 
at 
31-32 . 
33-34. 
3 4 . 
7 
and David E. Ross II entered into a Contract of Sale, a Consulting 
Agreement, and an Employment Agreement with Bennett Leasing.23 
The value to David E. Ross II was approximately $1,800,000.00.24 
In late 1986, R. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross became aware of the 
options outstanding to Bennett Leasing and David E. Ross II ?s 
contracts with Bennett Leasing.25 Equitable decided to purchase 
these options and the rights under David E. Ross IIfs contract.26 
It concluded these negotiations with Bennett's in the summer of 
1987.27 The conclusion of these negotiations, however, left 
Bennett Leasing with some potential claims against Galen Ross, 
Betsy Ross Rapps and David E. Ross II.28 
In the last quarter of 1986, Equitable approached David E. 
Ross II and attempted to purchase all of his stock.29 These 
negotiations, however, broke down because the parties were 
approximately $300,000.00 apart.30 At that time, Jay B. Bell 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
I d . 
at 
a t 
34-35 . 
3 7 . 
represented Equitable. David E. Ross II was represented by Paul 
Moxley and Robert Howell.31 Because Equitable was approaching 
David E. Ross II, Betsy Ross Rapps and Galen Ross separately, in an 
effort to purchase only one individual's stock holding, the three 
joined forces and entered into a voting trust.32 This forced 
Equitable to deal with the group as a whole and prevented Equitable 
from undermining the interests of one or two of the remaining 
individuals.33 
The negotiations between Equitable and the Selling Group, 
comprised of Galen Ross, Betsy Ross Rapps, David E. Ross II and 
Connie Ross, David E. Ross II fs wife, began in the summer of 
1987.34 The previous negotiations with Bennett Leasing always 
contained a ten percent interest rate for the payment over time of 
the money to be exchanged for all of the outstanding stock of the 
Selling Group.35 Equitable proposed that the Selling Group 
substitute a participation in Equitablefs Line 31 amount (income 
less federal taxes, except on capital gains, and less dividends to 
Id. 
Id. at 37-38. 
Id. at 38. 
Id. 
Id. 
9 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
policyholders) for the ten percent interest rate. 
4. The Terms of the Deal. 
There were numerous drafts of the documents leading to the 
Agreement dated October 30, 1987, which was executed by the 
parties.37 These drafts started to be circulated in July of 1987. 
All of these drafts were prepared on word processing equipment of 
Equitablefs attorney, Jay B. Bell.38 
As the negotiations became close to being resolved, Jay B. 
Bell, Equitablefs attorney, sent a letter to the Selling Group's 
attorney, Daniel W. Jackson, dated September 16, 1987.39 This 
letter began with the phrase, "Congratulations, settlement is at 
last at hand." On the first and second pages of the letter, it 
specifically refers to the Consulting Agreement for David E. Ross 
II with the present value of $200,000.00. It enclosed a draft of 
the Consulting Agreement.40 Mr. Jackson responded with a letter 
to Mr. Bell dated September 23, 1987,41 which made a number of 
Id. at 39. 
Id.; Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. P-2, P-3, P-4, P-7, P-8, P-
P-ll, P-12, P-13, P-14, P-15 & P-16. 
December 17, 1990 Trans, at 39. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-l. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5. 
10 
36 
37 
9, P-10, 
38 
39 
40 
41 
minor, rather technical changes in the way in which the language 
was phrased. 
As a result, an agreement in principal was struck in late 
September of 1987.42 Jay B. Bell sent a cover letter to the 
Selling Group's attorneys dated September 25, 1987,43 which 
enclosed both a draft of an Agreement44 and a draft of a proposed 
Consulting Agreement45 for David E. Ross II.46 This letter alsc 
started with the phrase, "Congratulations, settlement is at last at 
hand."47 The draft of the Agreement enclosed with the lettei 
dated September 25, 1987, contained a cost to Equitable (excludinc 
the Line 31 participation) of $6,005,000.00.48 The payment of the 
$200,000.00 for the Consulting Agreement was to be made directly tc 
42
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 39. 
43
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 5. 
44
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 7. 
45
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 6; December 17, 1990 Trans, at 
39-40. 
46
 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion foi 
Partial Summary Judgment dated December 3, 1990 ("Ross's 
Memorandum") 1f 5 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 426); Affidavit o1 
David E. Ross II dated December 3, 1990 ("Ross Affidavit") ir 2 (R, 
409-10); December 17, 1990 Trans, at 39-40. 
47
 Defendant's Exhibit 5; December 17, 1990 Trans, at 39. 
48
 Ross's Memorandum (Plaintiff's Material Undisputed Facts] 
ir 1 & fn. 1 (Plaintiff's Material Undisputed Facts) (R. 423); Ross 
Affidavit 1f 2 (R. 409-10). 
11 
David E. Ross II, not to the Selling Group or any other member of 
the Selling Group.49 Jay B. Bell's draft of the Agreement 
enclosed with his letter dated September 25, 1987, was the 
foundation for and was then separated by the Selling Group's 
attorneys into three different documents: (1) the Agreement, (2) 
the Addendum to Agreement, and (3) Escrow Instructions.50 The 
members of the Selling Group executed these documents on October 
30, 1987.51 There was no material change in the terms between 
these documents and the September 25, 1987 drafts of the 
contracts.52 Jay B. Bell's draft of the Agreement enclosed with 
his letter dated September 25, 1987, was separated into the three 
different documents for tax reasons. During the course of the 
negotiations some tax advantages were given to Equitable and taken 
into account in attempting to increase the sales price payable to 
the Selling Group. Equitable was indifferent, for example, as 
whether it paid $200,000.00 for the Consulting Agreement with 
49
 Ross's Memorandum If 2 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 
426); Ross's Affidavit 1f 2 (R. 409-10). 
50
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 42 & 55; Defendant's Exhibit 
13 describes the consideration being transferred between Equitable 
and the members of the Selling Group. 
51
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 42. 
52
 Ross's Memorandum If 2 (Plaintiff's Material Undisputed 
Facts) (R.423); Ross Affidavit 1f 2 (R. 409-10); December 17, 1990 
Trans, at 40. 
12 
before-tax dollars or $170,000-00 utilizing after-tax dollars. 
The Addendum to Agreement essentially contains income tax 
related provisions where the Selling Group agrees to indemnify 
Equitable in specified situations. In these specified situations, 
including the payments under the Consulting Agreement with David E. 
Ross II, if the I.R.S. does not allow the payment as a deduction 
against Equitable's income for income tax purposes, the Selling 
Group is required to indemnify Equitable for that amount. The 
documents were separated into three separate documents to minimize 
the Selling Group's risk that the I.R.S. would focus upon these 
individual payments, including the consulting payments to David E. 
Ross II.54 
The terms of the three documents were modified by a lettei 
from Jay B. Bell dated November 4, 1987,55 the date Equitable 
executed all three documents.56 One of the Selling Group's 
attorneys signed the November 4, 1987 letter. When David E. Ross 
II executed the three documents, he understood that the deal 
December 17, 1990 Trans, at 42. 
Id. at 43. 
Id. at 44. 
Id. at 44. 
13 
53 
54 
55 
56 
included a Consulting Agreement with a $200,000.00 present 
value.57 The Selling Group's attorney, Daniel Jackson, shared 
that understanding.58 The parties, however, never executed all of 
the final contract documents because Equitable refused to execute 
any form of a Consulting or Retainer Agreement with David E. Ross 
II.59 Further, neither the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, the 
Addendum to Agreement, the Escrow Instructions or the letter dated 
November 4, 1987, contained any type of integration clause:60 
that is to say, they did not contain all of the agreements between 
and among the parties. 
Equitable has taken the position that negotiations between the 
time Jay B. Bell sent the September 25, 1987, letter with its 
enclosed Agreement to the Selling Group and the time the parties 
executed the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, David E. Ross IIfs 
Consulting Agreement evaporated or disappeared.61 Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 21, however, which is reproduced below, demonstrates 
that only with the inclusion of the Consulting Agreement can the 
57
 Ross's Memorandum 1f 7 (Plaintiff's Material Undisputed 
Facts) (R. 424); Ross Affidavit » 2 (R. 409-10). 
58
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 79. 
59
 Ross's Memorandum V 6 (Plaintiff's Undisputed Material 
Facts) (R. 424); Ross Affidavit V 2 (R. 409-10). 
60
 See Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 8, 9 & 10. 
61
 December 4, 1990 Trans, at 5-6. 
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amount for which the parties negotiated be the same in the 
September 25, 1987 version and the minor modifications contained in 
the October 30, 1987 Agreement:62 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AND AMONG LETTER AND AGREEMENTS 
DESCRIPTION 
Cash 
Equitable Preferred Shares 
2000 Shares of Insurance 
Investment Preferred 
Consulting Agreement 
First Fidelity Bank 
Bennett Leasing 
Betsy's Travel Expenses 
[ David's Release Payment 
TOTALS 
D O C U M E N T S | 
Letter 
Dated 
09-25-87 
$ 1350,000 
3,829,400 
-0-
200,000 
250,000 
300,000 
600 
-0-
$ 5,930,000 
Agreement 
Enclosed 
With Letter 
Dated 
09-25-87 
$ 1350,000 
3330,000 
75,000 
200,000 
250,000 
300,000 
-0-
-0-
$ 6,005,000 
Agreement 
Dated 
10-30-87 
$ 1,450,000 
3,630,000 
75,000 1 
200,000 
250,000 
300,000 
-0-
100,000 1 
$ 6,005,000 
1 D I F F E R E N C E S 
Difference 
Between 
1 Agreements 
1 + $ 100,000 
- 200,000 
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
|+ 100,000 
Difference 
Between 
Letter and 
Enclosed 
Agreement 
-0-
+ 600 
+ 75,000 
-0-
-0-
-0-
- 600 
-0-
-0- +$75,000 
Differenc 
Between 
Letter anc 
Agreemer 
Dated 
10-30-87 
+ $100,0C 
- 1994C 
+ 75,00 
-0-
-0-
-0-
- 6( 
-0-
+ S 75,00 
The basic terms of the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, 
excluding the Line 31 participation, included cash and preferred 
62
 Ross's Memorandum V 8 (R. 427-28); Ross Affidavit IT 2 (R. 
409-10); cf. Jackson Affidavit Exhibit B [Equitablefs Memorandum 
Exhibit B] (R. 310-33) with Equitable Memorandum Exhibits C, D, E 
& H (R. 335-99). 
15 
stock valued at a total sum of $6,005,000.00. The Selling Group 
revised the Agreement enclosed with the September 25, 1987 letter, 
slightly modifying the Line 31 participation, but retaining the 
basic cost of $6,005,000.00.63 Between the deal reflected in the 
documents enclosed with the September 25, 1987, letter, on the one 
hand, and the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, the Addendum to 
Agreement, the Escrow Instructions and the letter dated November 4, 
1987, the following adjustments occurred: (1) the number of shares 
of preferred stock dropped by 200,000 shares at an agreed upon 
value of $10.00 per share for a net decrease of $200,000.00; (2) a 
Release for David E. Ross II in the sum of $100,000.00 was not 
included in the September 25, 1987 deal, causing a net increase of 
$100,000.00; and (3) the cash was increased by $100,000.00 between 
September 25, 1987 deal and October 30, 1987 deal.64 If the 
Consulting Agreement is included in both the September 25, 1987 
deal and the October 30, 1987 deal, the net effect is no difference 
in cost, unless as Equitable contends, the Consulting Agreement was 
traded for an increased Line 31 participation. Equitable contends 
that the increase in the Line 31 participation amounted to 
approximately $200,000.00, the present value of the Consulting 
December 17, 1990 Trans, at 56-57. 
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Agreement, and was traded for its elimination. 
5. The Line 31 Amount is Equitable's Income Less Federal 
Taxes and Dividends to Policyholders. 
To understand David E. Ross II's position in this case, it is 
necessary to understand the complicated Line 31 participation. The 
purported elimination of the Consulting Agreement was not a 
bargained for exchange for a claimed increase in the Line 31 
participation.66 This was a completely separately negotiated 
item.67 Essentially, the negotiation started with interest at ter 
percent per annum. The Line 31 amount was a substitution for thai 
interest.68 The Line 31 amount is Equitable's operating income, 
after the deduction of federal income taxes (excluding federal 
taxes on capital gains) and dividends to policyholders.69 The 
Selling Group is entitled to twenty percent of the Line 31 amounl 
when the Selling Group holds all of the shares of preferred stocJ 
issued to it initially. This participation is reducec 
69
 December 4, 1990 Trans, at 6 (lines 9-15). 
66
 Ross's Memorandum V 7 (Additional Material Facts) (R 
427); Ross Affidavit If 2 (R. 469-10); Jackson Depo. Trans, at 50-5-
(R. 435-40); Bell Depo. Trans, at 66-69 (R. 442-45). 
67
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 57. 
68
 Id. at 58. 
69
 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. P-39. 
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proportionately as shares are redeemed. 
The negotiation was over the number of days in 1987 the 
Selling Group would participate in the Line 31 amount.71 After 
1987, the Selling Group would participate based upon an entire 
year. Up through the date of payment under the Agreement, which 
was April 5 of the following year, at the time of the negotiations, 
the Selling Group was unable to accurately predict the Line 31 
amount.72 On July 29, 1987, they did not know what the 1987 Line 
31 amount would be for 1987 because the fiscal year had not 
closed.73 On July 29, 1987, Equitable offered the Selling Group 
5/12ths of the 1987 Line 31 participation amount.74 This offer 
was based upon the fact that there were five remaining months in 
1987 at that time.75 
The Agreement enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated 
September 25, 1987, in paragraph l(b)(5)(i), established the Line 
70
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 8 1f 1(b)(4)(H); December 4, 1990 
Trans, at 13. 
71
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 60. 
72
 Id. at 59. 
74
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 3; Ross's Memorandum 1f 6 
(Additional Material Facts) (R. 427); Ross Affidavit V 2 (R. 409-
10); December 4, 1990 Trans, at 14; December 17, 1990 Trans, at 61. 
75
 December 4, 1990 Trans, at 14. 
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31 participation as the number of days remaining in 1987 after the 
closing occurs and dividing it by 365. At that time, the closing 
was scheduled to occur within five days after the execution of the 
document.76 Equitable was prepared to immediately execute the 
Agreement and Consulting Agreement enclosed under cover of Jay B. 
Bell's letter dated September 25, 1987.77 The closing, however, 
was delayed due to the necessity of settling a lawsuit with Bennett 
Leasing.78 This required a hearing before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah.79 
The Selling Group then demanded the full year of 1987 for Line 
31 participation.80 In the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, 
paragraph 1(b)(5)(i) established the participation as "one half of 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 3; Ross's Memorandum ir 6 
(Additional Material Facts) (R. 427); Ross Affidavit 1[ 2 (R. 409-
10); December 4, 1990 Trans, at 14-15; December 17, 1990 Trans, at 
61. 
77
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 at 2. 
78
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 3; Ross's Memorandum 1f 6 
(Additional Material Facts) (R. 427); Ross Affidavit ir 2 (R. 409-
10); December 4, 1990 Trans, at 14-15; December 17, 1990 Trans, at 
61. 
79
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 3; Ross's Memorandum 1f 6 
(Additional Material Facts) (R. 427); Ross Affidavit V 2 (R. 409-
10); December 4, 1990 Trans, at 14-15; December 17, 1990 Trans at 
68. 
80
 December 4, 1990 Trans, at 15; December 17, 1990 Trans, 
at 61. 
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the Line 31 amount for 1987. x In the letter dated November 4, 
1987, which modified the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, the Line 
31 amount was established as 165 divided by 365, a reduction of 
17.5 days from the amount established in the Agreement dated 
October 30, 1987.82 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 23, reproduced below, establishes that 
there was never a change in the Line 31 participation between the 
September 25, 1987 deal and the October 30, 1987 deal that even 
approached a difference of $200,000.00, the agreed upon present 
value of the Consulting Agreement for David E. Ross II:83 
(On the following page) 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. 
83
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 69. This is a present value 
analysis. The Line 31 participation for 1987 is paid out over a 
ten-year period. December 17, 1990 Trans, at 66 & 69-70. 
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Comparison of Differences Between 1987 Line 31 Amounts 
No.1 
Draft 
No. 3 
Enclosed With j Agreement 
No. 4 No. 5 No. 6 
Hypothetical i Hypothetic 
No. 1: No. 2: 
TOTAL AMOUNT 
No.1 
Letter Dated 
July 29,1987 
Total 
Amount 
Letter Dated 
July 29,1987 
217,905 
Letter Dated j Dated 
Sept 25,1987 | Oct 30,1987 
131,817 261,486 
Letter Dated 1 
Nov. 4,1987 1 
236,412 
Closing to 
Year End 
41,551 
Execution 
to Pavmen 
217,785 
217,905 (86,088) 43,581 18,507 (176354) (120) 
No. 2 
Draft Enclosed With 
Letter Dated 
September 25,1987 
131,817 ( 86,088) 129,669 104395 (90,266) 85,968 
No. 3 
Agreement Dated 
October 30,1987 261,486 43,581 129,669 (25,074) (219,935) (43,701) 
No. 4 
Letter Dated 
November 4,1987 236^12 18307 104,595 (25,074) (194361) (18,627) 
No. 5 
Hypothetical No. 1: 
Closing to Year End 41351 (176354) (90,266) (219,935) (194361) 176,234 
No. 6 
Hypothetical No. 2: 
Execution to Payment 217,785 (120) 85,968 (43,701) (18,627) (176,234) 
Note that the difference between Equitablefs original offer 
contained in Jay B. Bell's letter dated July 29, 1987, and 
Hypothetical No. 2 — a comparison from the date of execution of 
the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, to the date of payment -- is 
virtually nonexistent (only $120.00). More importantly, the 
deference between the draft enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter 
doted September 25, 1987, and the final agreement contained in the 
November 4, 1987 letter is only $104,595.00, approximately one-half 
21 
84 
of the value of the Consulting Agreement, 
Defendant's Exhibit No, 22, which is reproduced below, shows 
that the negotiations over the Line 31 participation proceeded 
independently from the negotiation over other terms of the deal and 
was a negotiation representing numerous compromises: 
LINE 31 PARTICIPATION NEGOTIATIONS 
Line 31: 
1236 
$ 2,851,507 
1987 
$ 2,614,863 
Formula: (days-*-365) 20% x Line 31 
1. Letter dated July 29,1987 (Exhibit D-3) 
Offer: Five Months 
Calculation: (5 +12) 20% = 8333% of Line 31 
Letter Dated November 4,1987 (Exhibit D-ll) 
Offer 165 days 
Calculation: (165+365) 20% = 9.041% of Line 31 
Year 
1986 
1987 
Total Amount Per Share 
$ 237,625 62c 
$ 217,905 57c 
Xoi 
1986 
1987 
Total Amount 
$ 257,807 
$ 236,412 
Per Share 
71c 
65c 
Draft Enclosed with Letter Dated September 25,1987 
(Exhibit D-7) — Assuming Immediate Execution 
Offer. 92 Days (9-25-87 + 5 days) 
Calculation: (92 + 365) 20% = 5.041% of Line 31 
Hypothetical No. 1 - - From Actual Closing on December 2, 
1987 to Year End 
Offer Hypothetical 
Calculation: (29 + 365) 20% = 1.589% of Line 31 
Xtti 
1986 
1987 
Total Amount 
$ 143,747 
$ 131,817 
Per Share 
38C 
34c 
l o t 
1986 
1987 
Total Amount 
$ 45^11 
$ 41351 
Per Share 
12C 
l ie 
Agreement Dated October 30,19871 l(6)(5)(i) (Exhibit D-8) 6. 
Offer One Half of 1987 
Calculation: 50% x 20% = 10% of Line 31 
Hypothetical No. 2 - - From Date of Execution 
(November 4,1987) to Date of First Payment (April 5,1988) 
Offer Hypothetical 
Calculation: (152 -«- 365) 20% = 8329% of Line 31 
XlM 
1986 
1987 
Total Amount 
$ 285,151 
$ 261,486 
Per Share 
79c 
fit 
Year 
1986 
1987 
Total Amount 
S 237,495 
$ 217,785 
EexShaxs 
65c 
60c 
84 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 70. 
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In fact, no matter how it is viewed, the alleged "increase" in 
the Line 31 amount participation did not equal the present value of 
the Consulting Agreement: $200,000.00. Consequently, the 
suggestion that the Selling Group exchanged a Consulting Agreement 
with a present value of $200,000.00 for a lesser increase in the 
Line 31 participation with a present value of $104,595.00 does not 
make any sense. This would result in a net loss to the Selling 
Group of $95, 405.00.85 
6. No language in the Contract Documents Suggest that the 
Consulting Agreement Was Eliminated. 
Equitable contends that the deal reflected in the Agreement 
dated October 30, 1987, the Addendum to Agreement, the Escrow 
Instructions, and the letter dated November 4, 1987, does not 
contain a Consulting Agreement. Mr. David E. Ross II fs position 
simply stated is that the deal reflected in part by the Agreement 
and the Addendum to Agreement required Equitable to enter into a 
Consulting Agreement with him, but after those documents were 
executed, Equitable had no intention of entering into a Consulting 
Agreement; the Consulting Agreement was a material term of the 
deal.86 Pages 4 ana 5 of the Agreement enclosed with Jay B. 
Bell's letter dated September 25, 1987, states in part as follows: 
85
 December 4, 1990 Trans, at 19. 
86
 Ross's Memorandum ir 7 (Plaintiff's Undisputed Material 
Facts) (R. 424); Ross Affidavit 1f 2 (R. 409-10). 
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(iii) The purchase price of all of the 
Selling Group's then unpurchased preferred 
stock shall be decreased by the amount of 
federal taxes, interest and penalties incurred 
and paid by Equitable as a result of an audit 
or audits in which Equitablef s income tax 
obligation is increased from adjustments as a 
result of the deduction as an ordinary and 
reasonable business expense of any of the 
following being partially or totally 
disallowed: 
1) consulting payments to David; 
2) payment of $300,000 to Bennett 
Leasing Company; and 
3) payment of $250,000 to First 
Fidelity Bank. 
The Selling Group will be informed of any 
audits concerning the above deductions and 
will be given the opportunity to participate 
in such audits. 
Further, page 2 of the Addendum to Agreement states as follows (the 
language in bold is taken verbatim from the preceding quote):87 
1. Line 31 amount. During the period 
while the Equitable Preferred Stock, (as 
defined in the Agreement) is issued and 
outstanding, Equitable agrees to use its best 
efforts to make the cumulative total of the 
Line 31 Amounts ( as defined in the Agreement) 
for said period as large as possible. 
2. Offset. The redemption, or purchase 
price of the Equitable Preferred Stock owned 
or attributed to the Selling Group and 
redeemed or purchased by Equitable shall be 
offset and decreased by the amount of federal 
taxes, interest and penalties, incurred and 
December 17, 1990 Trans, at 51. 
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paid by Equitable as a result of an audit or 
audits in which Equitablefs income tax 
obligation is increased from adjustments made 
as a result of the deduction as an ordinary 
and reasonable expense of any of the following 
being partially or totally disallowed; 
(a) Consulting payments to David; 
(b) Payment of $300,000 to Bennett 
Leasing Company; 
(c) Settlement of lawsuits with 
David E. Ross, II; 
(d) Payment of $250,00 [sic] to 
First National State Bank of New Jersey. 
Equitable will inform the Selling Group 
of any audits concerning the above deductions 
and the Selling Group will be given the 
opportunity to participate in such audits. 
The language in both documents is virtually identical.88 Both 
specifically refer to "Consulting payments to David." This 
language, "Consulting payments to David," is taken verbatim from 
the Agreement enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated September 
25, 1987. It is Mr. Bell's own language.89 This language would 
make no sense if the Consulting Agreement was not part of the deal 
Ross's Memorandum V 1 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 
425); Ross's Memorandum V 1 (R. 425); Ross Affidavit ir 2 (R. 409-
10); cf. Equitable Memorandum Exhibit D (R. 358-60) with Affidavit 
of Daniel Jackson, Exhibit B V l(b)(5)(iii) V 2 [Equitable 
Memorandum Exhibit B] (R. 321-22). 
25 
on the date the Addendum to Agreement was executed by the 
parties.90 The language, "Consulting payments to David," is in 
both drafts because the parties contemplated a Consulting Agreement 
upon the execution of the Addendum to Agreement.91 Equitable 
admits that the Consulting Agreement was part of the deal as of 
September 25, 1987,92 but fails to explain how the same language, 
its own language, in the Addendum to Agreement (executed by 
Equitable on November 4, 1987) means exactly the opposite: that no 
Consulting Agreement is included in the deal. 
7. There Was No Negotiation Exchanging David E. Ross II fs 
Consulting Agreement for Any Claimed Line 31 
Participation. 
There was no specific direct or indirect negotiation 
eliminating the payment for the Consulting Agreement.93 Without 
discussing it with anyone, Jay B. Bell merely concluded that it was 
Ross's Memorandum 1f 1 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 
425); Ross Affidavit 1[ 2 (R. 409-10); December 4, 1990 Trans, at 
18-19. 
91
 See Defendant's Exhibit No. 9. 
92
 Equitable's Memorandum (Undisputed Facts) 1f 1 (R. 284-
85). 
93
 Ross's Memorandum 1f 3 (Plaintiff's Material Undisputed 
Facts) (R. 423-24); Ross Affidavit ir 2 (R. 409-10); Jackson Depo. 
Trans, at 50-54 (R. 435-40); Bell Depo. Trans, at 66-69 (R. 442-
45); December 17, 1990 Trans, at 52 & 58. 
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eliminated.94 Mr. Bell's assumption that the Consulting Agreement 
was eliminated was based upon his claim that there was an increase 
in the Line 31 participation.95 The elimination of the Consulting 
Agreement was never discussed with David E. Ross II or either of 
his attorneys, John Caine or Daniel Jackson.96 In other words, 
there was never any communication from Equitable to the Selling 
Group that, in exchange for some increase in the Line 31 
participation, the Selling Group was giving up the Consulting 
Agreement. That conversation never occurred because the 
negotiations over the Line 31 participation was a completely 
independent negotiation and did not involve the Consulting 
Agreement.9? 
8. The Pre-Closing Held on November 30, 1987. 
A Retainer Agreement was drafted at the pre-closing or 
November 30, 1987.98 Other documents were drafted at the pre 
closing, including stock transfers and releases.99 
94
 Bell Depo. Trans, at 69 (R. 445); December 17, 199C 
Trans, at 52. 
95
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 52. 
96
 Ross's Memorandum ir 3 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 
426); Ross Affidavit V 2 (R. 409-10). 
97
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 58. 
98
 Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12 & 13. 
99
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 71. 
27 
9. The Closing Held on December 2, 1987. 
Prior to the closing, no one informed David E. Ross II that he 
would not receive a Consulting Agreement,100 At the closing, for 
the first time, Jay B. Bell verbally articulated that Equitable did 
not intend to enter into a Consulting Agreement.101 At the 
closing, however, prior to that announcement, negotiations were 
occurring between David E. Ross II and R. Earl Ross as to whether 
the payments in the Consulting Agreement would be made at the 
beginning or the end of each year.102 Drafts of the Consulting or 
Retainer Agreement were exchanged between the parties. 
At Equitable's request, David E. Ross II proceeded with the 
closing with the reservation of his rights.103 This is the reason 
that the closing took such a long period of time. Equitable wanted 
David E. Ross II to sign the documents. At the closing, Equitable 
would not have signed any form of Consulting or Retainer 
Agreement.104 Equitable asserted for the first time that the 
100
 Ross's Memorandum 1f 3 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 
426); Ross Affidavit ir 2 (R. 409-10); December 17, 1990 Trans, at 
52. 
101
 Id.; Bell Depo. Trans, at 69 (R. 445). 
102
 Ross's Memorandum If 4 (Additional Material Facts) (R. 
426); Ross Affidavit 1Mf 2 & 3 (R. 409-10); December 17, 1990 Trans, 
at 97. 
103
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 97. 
104
 Id. at 71. 
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Consulting Agreement had been exchanged for the alleged "increase" 
in the Line 31 amount participation. In none of the negotiations 
with Daniel Jackson or any other member of the Selling Group did 
Equitable refer to the exchange of the Consulting Agreement for the 
alleged "increase" in the Line 31 participation.105 At that time, 
they attempted to negotiate the matter, but it was fruitless 
because Equitable did not want to retain David E. Ross II under any 
condition.106 At a minimum, David E. Ross II would have executed 
the Consulting Agreement enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated 
September 25, 1987.107 
At the closing, the parties executed a document drafted by Mr. 
Bell essentially directing Equitable to pay the cash downpayment 
due pursuant to the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, to the 
Selling Group's attorneys' trust account and directing Zions Bank 
to deliver the stock it was holding to Equitable's attorney, Jay B. 
Bell. In this document,108 David E. Ross II specifically reserved 
his rights with the following language:109 
105
 Jackson Depo. Trans, at 50-54 (R. 435-40); Bell Depo. 
Trans, at 66-69 (R. 442-45); Ross's Memorandum (Additional Material 
Facts) 1f 7 (R. 427); Ross Affidavit ir 2 (R. 409-10). 
106
 December 17, 1990 Trans, at 71. 
107
 Id. at 84. 
108
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 14. 
109
 Id.; December 4, 1990 Trans, at 24. 
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By signing this instrument I do not waive 
any right or claim to pursue the Consulting 
Agreement pursuant to the agreement between 
the parties. Not given for acceptance of any 
funds. In addition acceptance of any funds 
pursuant to the agreement shall not constitute 
a waiver of any kind. 
Further, E. Roderick Ross and R. Earl Ross, Equitable1 s 
officers, both executed an interlineated phrase on the bottom of 
this document110 which states in part as follows: "Acceptance of 
this cash downpayment by Daniel Jackson, esquire trustee account is 
not a waiver of rights by David E. Ross."111 Equitable agreed 
that the handwritten language on Defendant's Exhibit No. 14 
constituted a reservation and not a waiver of all of David E. Ross 
II fs rights.112 
10. David E. Ross IIfs Notice of Rescission. 
A little over one week after the closing, David E. Ross II 
served upon Equitable a Notice of Rescission dated December 10, 
1987.113 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Equitable's argument that David E. Ross II is not entitled to 
rescission because he has an adequate remedy of law is 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 14. 
Id. 
December 17, 1990 Trans, at 97. 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 15. 
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no 
in 
112 
113 
disingenuous, especially in the light of Equitablefs later 
argument, adopted by the District Court, that David E. Ross II was 
not entitled to recover for a breach by Equitable due to its 
failure to enter into a Consulting Agreement, because its terms 
were not established. 
David E. Ross II did not waive and clearly reserved all of his 
claims, including his claim for equitable relief such as 
rescission. Further, David E. Ross IIfs rights under the terms of 
the deal put together by the parties were separable. Consequently, 
it is not necessary to have any of the other members of the Selling 
Group's rights undone in order to grant equitable relief to David 
E. Ross II in the form of rescission. 
There was considerable evidence indicating that Equitable was 
under an obligation to enter into a Consulting Agreement. 
Equitablefs refusal to negotiate the terms of the Consulting 
Agreement constituted a breach of its duty of good faith. Even if 
this evidence was insufficient to establish a Consulting Agreement 
between the parties, at a minimum the evidence established that 
David E. Ross II was working under the reasonable assumption that 
he was entitled to a $200,000.00 payment pursuant to the terms of 
the Consulting Agreement and that Equitable knew or had reason to 
know of his mistaken assumption. David E. Ross II, therefore, is 
entitled to relief under a theory of unilateral mistake. 
31 
ARGUMENT 
The granting of Summary Judgment in this case is subject to de 
novo review.114 When reviewing an Order granting Summary 
Judgment, the facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
party opposing the Motion and that party is to be given the benefit 
of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence. The determination of whether the facts reviewed under 
such a standard justify entry of judgment is a question of law, and 
a reviewing court should accord the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference, but review them for correctness.115 
In considering the motion for summary judgment, it is not 
appropriate for a court to weigh evidence or assess credibility. 
The sole initial inquiry is whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact.116 Documentary evidence is not dispositive if 
the purpose and intent underlying the documents are at issue.117 
Furthermore, it only takes one sworn statement to dispute the 
114
 6 Moore's Federal Practice V 56.27[1] at 56-852. 
115
 Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037, 1039-40 
(Utah 1991). 
116
 W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 
56, 59 (Utah 1981). 
117
 Id. 
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averments on the other side of the controversy and create such an 
issue.118 
POINT I 
DAVID E. ROSS II SPECIFICALLY 
RESERVED ALL OF HIS CLAIMS AT THE 
CLOSING, AND THE CLOSING BY THE 
OTHER PARTIES DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
WAIVER OF ANY OF HIS CLAIMS. 
David E. Ross II did not waive any of his claims. David E. 
Ross II is not bound to a waiver of his rights unless such a waiver 
is distinctly made, with full knowledge of the rights he intends to 
waive. The fact that he knows his rights and intends to waive them 
must plainly appear.119 In Lindon City v. Engineers Construction 
Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981), this Court stated that "[u]nder 
Article I, Section 11, a party may intentionally and deliberately 
waive the ordinary and usual remedy to which a party is entitled 
for the redress of a wrong, but such a waiver should be expressed 
in the most unequivocable terms. . . .H Id. at 1074 citing Bracken 
v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 499, 251 P. 16 (1926). A finding of waiver 
requires that the conduct of the actor demonstrates an intentional 
118
 Id. 
119
 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 311-
12 (Utah 1936). 
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relinquishment of the known right. 
The District Court found that David E. Ross II waived his 
equitable right of rescission for two reasons: (1) from the 
language found in Defendant's Exhibit No. 14, where David E. Ross 
II attempted to explicitly preserve all of his claims and stated 
that his execution of the closing documents was not to be 
considered a waiver of any kind; and (2) from David E. Ross II's 
conduct in participating in the closing by executing Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 14. 
David E. Ross II specifically preserved his rights stating 
that the "acceptance of any funds pursuant to the agreement shall 
not constitute a waiver of any kind."121 Further, on the same 
document, E. Roderick Ross and R. Earl Ross, Equitablefs 
executives, stated in part "acceptance of this cash downpayment by 
Daniel Jackson, esquire trustee account is not a waiver of rights 
by David E. Ross."122 Despite this very clear language reserving 
all rights, the District Court reached the conclusion that the 
language constituted a reservation of legal rights only, but 
constituted a waiver of the equitable remedy of rescission. There 
120
 Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 578 
(Utah 1985); B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, 
Inc., 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
121
 Defendant's Exhibit No. 14. 
122
 Id. 
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is absolutely nothing in the record or in the case law that would 
support this conclusion. The finding of a waiver is against the 
express language used by the parties. 
David E. Ross II did not, as Equitable contends, facilitate 
the closing in this case. If any party facilitated the closing, 
Equitable did so. Equitable knew that David E. Ross II refused to 
execute his stock certificates because of Equitablefs refusal to 
enter into a Consulting Agreement. Equitable, nevertheless, 
transferred $1,450,000.00 to the Selling Group and received more 
than adequate compensation for this transfer consisting of the 
stock of the members of the Selling Group other than David E. Ross 
II. 
Further, David E. Ross II fs interest in the Agreement dated 
October 30, 1987 can be clearly identified. All David E. Ross II 
requests is that the stock he placed in escrow be returned to him. 
Because the Agreement dated October 30, 1987 and the Addendum to 
Agreement as it relates to David E. Ross II is severable or the 
peculiar circumstances of this case make it essential to a just 
result, the failure to join other members of the Selling Group to 
the lawsuit and rescind the entire transaction is not 
essential.123 
123
 Jones v. CPR Pi v. the Upjohn Co., 120 Ariz. 147, 584 P. 2d 
611, 617-18 (Ariz. App. 1978). 
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POINT II 
THERE IS MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THIS 
CASE DEMONSTRATING THAT EQUITABLE 
AGREED TO ENTER INTO A CONSULTING 
AGREEMENT WITH DAVID E. ROSS II. 
Under cover of Jay B. Bell's letter dated September 25, 1987, 
Mr. Bell enclosed an Agreement and a Consulting Agreement, which he 
indicated that Equitable was willing to sign. The Selling Group 
modified only the Agreement by separating it into three separate 
documents for income tax purposes, the Agreement dated October 30, 
1987, the Addendum to Agreement, and the Escrow Instructions. The 
other changes the Selling Group made were minor in nature and, with 
the exception of the on-going negotiation over the Line 31 
participation, contained exactly the same cost to Equitable. There 
was no rejection, therefore, of the Consulting Agreement enclosed 
with Jay B. Bell's letter dated September 25, 1987. The only 
changes that occurred were in the Agreement with that letter. The 
parties, therefore, had reached an agreement in principal as of 
September 25, 1987. The only modifications that occurred after 
that date did not effect the requirement for Equitable to enter 
into a Consulting Agreement. The Agreement dated October 30, 1987, 
the Addendum to Agreement and the Escrow Instructions together 
constituted a new, enforceable agreement modifying only the terms 
of the Agreement enclosed with the letter dated September 25, 1987, 
but not affecting the remaining aspects of the deal, including the 
36 
Consulting Agreement. 
Even if there was no binding agreement reached as reflected in 
Jay B. Bell's letter dated September 25, 1987, and the enclosed 
Agreement and Consulting Agreement, there is no integration clause 
in the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, the Addendum to Agreement, 
or the letter dated November 4, 1987. Admittedly, although not 
applicable to this case, there is a rebuttable presumption that a 
written contract which appears to be complete and certain is 
integrated. In considering whether parol evidence can be utilized 
to establish terms in addition to those in a written agreement, the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P. 2d 547 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), stated as follows: 
"Only when contract terms are complete, clear, 
and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the 
judge on a motion for summary judgment." 
(citation omitted.) 
The mere raising of a non-integration claim 
will not result in automatic admission of 
extrinsic evidence. In Stanger v. Sentinel 
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that even where a 
contract was claimed to be only partially 
integrated, only 
parol evidence not inconsistent with the 
writing is admissible to show what the 
entire contract really was, by 
Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 
964, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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supplementing, as distinguished from 
contradicting, the writing. In such a 
case parol evidence to prove the part not 
reduced to writing is admissible, 
although it is not admissible as to the 
part reduced to writing. 
Id. at 1205 (quoting 30 Am.Jur. 2d, Evidence § 
1043) (emphasis added). See also State Bank 
of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 
1977) ("parol evidence of contemporaneous 
conversations, representations or statements 
will not be received for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of the written 
agreement"). Therefore, in most instances, 
where a binding agreement exists, whether 
completely or partially integrated, evidence 
of prior or contemporaneous agreements or 
discussions is not admissible to contradict 
terms of the written agreement. Restatement 
(Second), Contracts § 215. 
Id. at 551. 
The Addendum to Agreement specifically refers to "Consulting 
payments to David." This language demonstrates two important 
principles in this case: (1) the documents are not integrated on 
their face and contemplate a Consulting Agreement; and (2) David E. 
Ross II's claim that a Consulting Agreement is part of the deal is 
consistent with and supplemental to the explicit terms of the 
written documents. 
The facts when viewed most favorably to David E. Ross II 
establish Equitable's obligation to enter into a Consulting 
Agreement. The language, "Consulting payments to David," in the 
Agreement enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated September 25, 
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1987, was used when the Consulting Agreement was part of the deal. 
It was also used in the Addendum to Agreement executed by all of 
the parties. The inference to be drawn is that a Consulting 
Agreement was part of the deal when the parties executed the 
Addendum to Agreement containing identical language. To infer 
otherwise violates the principle rule of the construction of 
contracts that contracts are to be interpreted giving full meaning 
to all of the language used and are to be interpreted to harmonize 
all of its provisions.125 Any other interpretation would write 
this language out of the Addendum to Agreement. 
Without the Consulting Agreement, the consideration paid to 
the members of the Selling Group drops by approximately $95,000.00 
below Equitablefs offer contained in Jay B. Bell's letter dated 
September 25, 1987, and its enclosure. With two parties 
negotiating over an extended period of time, both in their best 
interests, it makes no sense to suggest that the Selling Group 
would be willing to accept less compensation than Equitable 
previously was willing to pay when the Selling Group separated 
Equitablefs draft of the Agreement into three separate documents 
for tax reasons. The purpose of separating Jay B. Bell's draft of 
the Agreement into three separate documents was to make some minor 
adjustments in the way the compensation was paid and to give the 
125
 E.g., Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). 
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Selling Group, who would be responsible for any taxes paid as a 
result of negative tax consequences from the deal to Equitable, the 
best opportunity to avoid that risk. It certainly was not to 
obtain less money for the Selling Group as a whole. 
Finally, there was absolutely no communication from the 
Selling Group to Equitable or from Equitable to the Selling Group 
that the Consulting Agreement had been eliminated from the deal. 
For Equitable to make that self-serving assumption was 
presumptuous, incorrect, and in fact a sharp business tactic 
designed to personally harm David E. Ross II. 
There is one final compelling piece of evidence that 
demonstrates that the Consulting Agreement was part of the deal 
between the parties: at the pre-closing and closing, before 
Equitable expressed its position that the Consulting Agreement was 
no longer part of the deal, direct negotiations occurred on the 
terms of the Consulting Agreement, including whether the payments 
of $52,000.00 over a five-year period were to be made at the 
beginning or end of the year, something that would affect its 
present value. The inference that should be drawn from these 
negotiations follows: Equitablefs expression that it did not 
understand the Consulting Agreement to be part of the deal was 
disingenuous because its conduct demonstrated a contrary intent. 
These negotiations would be a waste of time and resources in the 
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event there was no Consulting Agreement if, as Equitable contends, 
it never had an intention of entering into a Consulting Agreement 
after it executed the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, the 
Addendum to Agreement, the Escrow Instructions, and the letter 
dated November 4, 1987. 
At the very minimum, a Consulting Agreement represented only 
three percent of the deal, something Equitable characterized as 
minimal. If the Consulting Agreement is an unessential term of the 
stock transaction, as Equitable contends, at a minimum Equitable 
had entered into an enforceable agreement to agree. The California 
Supreme Court in Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American 
Aviation, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713 (1966) (in bank), set 
forth the principles of law relating to the enforceability of an 
agreement to agree: 
The general rule is that if an "essential 
element" of a promise is reserved for the 
future agreement of both parties, the promise 
gives rise to no legal obligation until such 
future agreement is made. (Ablett v. Clauson, 
43 Cal.2d 280, 284-285, 272 P.2d 753; City of 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 423, 
433, 333 P.2d 745.) "The enforceability of a 
contract containing a promise to agree depends 
upon the relative importance and the 
severability of the matter left to the future; 
it is a question of degree and may be settled 
by determining whether the indefinite promise 
is so essential to the bargain that inability 
to enforce that promise strictly according to 
its terms would make unfair the enforcement of 
the remainder of the agreement. [Citations.] 
Where the matters left for future agreement 
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are unessential, each party will be forced to 
accept a reasonable determination of the 
unsettled point or if possible the unsettled 
point may be left unperformed and the 
remainder of the contract be enforced• 
[Citations.]" (City of Los Angeles v. 
Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.2d 423, 433, 333 
P.2d 745, 750; Metropolitan Water Dist. of 
Southern California v. Marquardt, 59 Cal.2d 
159, 194, 28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 28.) 
Id. at 7-8, 420 P.2d at 719-20; accord Buehner Black Co. v. UWC 
Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 898 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, a number of documents were left to be drafted at 
the pre-closing and closing of the deal. Equitablefs conduct 
indicates that Equitable was aware that it was under an obligation 
to finalize the terms of the Consulting Agreement at the pre-
closing or closing. It was not until after drafts had been 
exchanged and considerable negotiations had occurred that Jay B. 
Bell expressed his opinion that there was no Consulting Agreement 
as part of the deal. Equitable has breached its obligation, its 
agreement to agree, and its duty of good faith and fair dealing126 
by refusing to enter into a Consulting Agreement with David E. Ross 
II in any form. At a minimum, David E. Ross II would have executed 
the Consulting Agreement enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated 
September 25, 1987. 
126
 St. Benedictf s Development Co. v. St. Benedict' s 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991). 
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POINT III 
IF THERE IS NO BINDING CONTRACT 
REQUIRING EQUITABLE TO PAY THE 
$200,000-00 CONSULTING PAYMENT TO 
DAVID E. ROSS II, THE SUBSTANTIAL, 
UNREFUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THE 
ELEMENTS OF UNILATERAL MISTAKE IN 
THIS CASE, ENTITLING HIM TO 
RESCISSION 
Not only were material facts presented precluding the entry of 
a Summary Judgment on the issue of unilateral mistake, but 
substantial, unrefuted evidence existed in the record establishing 
the right of David E. Ross II to rescission based upon a unilateral 
mistake. This Court in Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1989), set forth the elements of a unilateral mistake as 
follows: 
Professor Corbin has stated: "There is 
practically universal agreement that, if the 
material mistake of one party was caused by 
the other, either purposely or innocently, or 
was known to him, or was of such character and 
accompanied by such circumstances that he had 
reason to know of it, the mistaken party has a 
right to rescission." 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts, § 610, at 692 (1960). In truth, 
Utah law is in accord. When one party's 
mistake of fact is coupled with knowledge of 
the mistake by the other party or a mistake is 
produced by fraud or other inequitable conduct 
by the nonerring party, the mistake provides a 
basis for reformation or rescission. See 
Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 
1980), Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 
(Utah 1977). 
Id. at 5. 
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Obviously David E. Ross II believed that a Consulting 
Agreement with a present value of $200,000.00 was part of the deal 
when he signed the Agreement dated October 30, 1987, the Addendum 
to Agreement, and the Escrow Instructions. Both he and the Selling 
Group's attorney, Daniel Jackson, believed the Consulting Agreement 
was part of the deal. It always was part of the deal, and no one 
informed them otherwise until they attended the closing held a 
month after the documents were executed. 
Despite Jay B. Bell's protestation to the contrary, Equitable 
was well aware of David E. Ross IIfs mistake. Jay B. Bell merely 
assumed that it was no longer part of the deal because the Selling 
Group's Line 31 participation was increased in the Agreement dated 
October 30, 1987. He assumed that this increase was an offset for 
the consulting payments to David E. Ross II which had a present 
value of $200,000.00. The evidence, however, demonstrates that the 
increase in the Line 31 participation between the Agreement 
enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated September 25, 1987, and 
the Line 31 participation reflected in the October 30, 1987, 
Agreement, as modified by Mr. Bell's letter dated November 4, 1987, 
was approximately one half of the value of the Consulting 
Agreement. Jay B. Bell's lame excuse does not justify his 
conclusion that the Consulting Agreement somehow evaporated. 
Further, the language from the Addendum to Agreement contained 
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the phrase, "Consulting payments to David," taken verbatim from Jay 
B. Bell's draft of the Agreement enclosed with his September 25, 
1987 letter, when everyone agreed that the Consulting Agreement 
with a present value of $200,000.00 was part of the deal. Mr. 
Bell, however, has never been able to explain why this language 
would exist in the Addendum to Agreement if the Consulting 
Agreement was not part of the deal. 
Despite the assumption that Mr. Bell made, he never asked the 
Selling Group's attorney for clarification as to whether they 
shared his rather rash conclusion. He did not even announce his 
conclusion until the closing held on December 2, 1987, a month 
after the documents were executed. By that time, negotiations had 
occurred between David E. Ross II and Equitable as to minor details 
in the Consulting Agreement such as whether the payments of 
$52,000.00 a year over a five year period would commence at the 
beginning or the end of each year. These negotiations evidence the 
intent of the parties, i.e., that Equitable believed that the 
Consulting Agreement was still part of the deal, and indicate that 
Jay B. Bell's announcement two days later was a self-serving 
fabrication by Equitable in an effort to take advantage of David E. 
Ross IIfs mistake. 
David E. Ross II thought that the contract documents he was 
signing included a Consulting Agreement with a $200,000.00 present 
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value, and the evidence demonstrates that Equitable was aware of 
this mistake at the time it executed the contract documents. 
Equitable seeks to take advantage of that mistake by paying less 
than it offered to pay in its offer contained in the Agreement and 
Consulting Agreement enclosed with Jay B. Bell's letter dated 
September 25, 1987. 
Finally, if the Consulting Agreement is an essential term of 
the stock transaction, as David E. Ross II contends, then 
Equitable!s failure to enter into the Consulting Agreement means 
that no contract has been formed, and the Agreement dated October 
30, 1987, and the Addendum to Agreement are not enforceable against 
him. This alone would require a determination that David E. Ross 
II is entitled to the return of his stock now held in escrow. 
POINT IV 
EQUITABLE WAS ONLY ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON CAUSES 
OF ACTION RELATING TO THE BREACH OR 
VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT DATED 
OCTOBER 30, 1987. 
Equitable obtained an award of attorneys' fees and costs 
against David E. Ross II based upon the following provision in the 
Agreement dated October 30, 1987: 
Attorney' s Fees; In the event any party 
hereto alleges a breach or violation of the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement by 
another party, the prevailing party to such 
resulting action shall have a right to recover 
from the non-prevailing party any and all 
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costs and expenses, including reasonable 
attorneys1 fees, incurred in the defense or 
pursuit of said action. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The primary thrust of David E. Ross II's Counterclaim was for 
rescission. Equitable is only entitled to recover for attorneys1 
fees expended on the damage aspect of this case. 
In Utah, attorneys1 fees are awardable only if authorized by 
contract or statute.127 If provided for in the contract, the 
award of attorneys1 fees is allowed only in accordance with the 
terms of the contract.128 Hours spent on claims for which 
attorneys1 fees are not recoverable must be separated out from the 
recoverable attorneys1 fees.129 A claim for rescission is outside 
the scope of the Agreement dated October 30, 1987. For example, if 
David E. Ross II had prevailed on his rescission claim, he would 
not have been entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under the 
terms of the Agreement. Likewise, a defense to David E. Ross II's 
127
 Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988); Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 
1985); Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 
667, 671 (Utah 1982). 
128
 Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988; Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (1984). 
129
 See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1982). 
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rescission claim cannot formulate the basis for an award of 
attorneys' fees. 13° 
In fact, the expenditure of Equitable?s attorneys' time on 
anything other than the rescission claim was rather limited. If 
David E. Ross II failed to prevail on the rescission claim, the 
relief Equitable sought in its Complaint would naturally follow. 
Rescission was not a defense to the claims contained in Equitable's 
Complaint; rather, it was a distinct and separate aspect, and the 
primary thrust of David E. Ross II fs Counterclaim; it was the 
reason Equitable filed the Complaint (due to David E. Ross II fs 
Notice of Rescission). Consequently, Equitable should not be 
allowed to recover attorneys1 fees relating to the defense of David 
E. Ross IIfs Counterclaim for rescission. These attorneys' fees 
and costs would include, among other things, the following: (a) 
the deposition of Jay B. Bell; (b) the deposition of Daniel 
Jackson; (c) most of the deposition of David E. Ross II; (d) time 
spent interviewing Stuart Fredman; (e) time spent propounding or 
responding to written discovery directed to facts relating to 
rescission; and (f) time spent preparing and arguing Equitablefs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on rescission aspect of David 
Ross's Counterclaim. 
See L&M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 450 (Utah 1984). 
48 
POINT V 
DAVID E. ROSS II SHOULD NOT BE 
REQUIRED TO PAY FOR EQUITABLE's 
TRIAL TACTICS. 
Equitable intentionally chose to proceed on the basis of a 
Partial Summary Judgment soley on David E. Ross II fs rescission 
claim contained in his Counterclaim rather than all aspects of the 
case. This obviously was done for tactical reasons because 
Equitable's position on David E. Ross II's Counterclaim — that a 
contract existed covering all aspects of the relationships between 
the parties — was inconsistent with Equitable's position on David 
E. Ross II's damage claim -- that a contract was never formed 
between the parties on the Consulting Agreement. 
If Equitable's position on David E. Ross II fs damage claim had 
merit, and by implication the District Court found that it did 
because the District Court converted the opening statements into a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted it in Equitable's favor, 
Equitablefs failure to bring all aspects of this case in a Motion 
for Summary Judgment was purely for tactical reasons. Obviously, 
therefore, Equitable's choice of these more expensive trial tactics 
should not be at David E. Ross II's expense. Consequently, a 
substantial amount of Equitable's attorneys' time spent preparing 
for the trail of this case should not be charged against David E. 
Ross II. Equitable, of course, is entitled to proceed in this case 
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in any manner it chooses to proceed. Equitable, however, should 
not be allowed to make David E. Ross II pay for attorneys' fees 
associated with the advanced trial tactics it utilized in this 
case, especially for considerable expenditures of time spent 
preparing for trial when Equitable failed to file a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the exact basis it argued to the Court after 
the opening statements. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial material facts exist which preclude the granting 
of summary judgment in this case on both David E. Ross IIfs remedy 
of rescission and claim for breach of contract. Consequently, this 
Court should reverse the summary judgments entered by the District 
Court and remand the case for trial. 
DATED: October 17, 1991. 
CAMPBELL MAACK fit SESSIONS 
Jtl.l /. L.se^ 
Mark A. Larsen 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
David E. Ross II 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(d), I hereby 
certify that I caused four (4) true and correct copies of BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be mailed through the U.S. Postmaster, postage 
prepaid, to the following counsel of record: 
P. Bruce Badger 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
DATED: October 17, 1991. 
data\ross\appellan.brf 
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ADDENDUM 
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FILED gHSTMCTOttftT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 7 1990 
SMLT LAKE u^oUTY 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
EQUITABLE LIFE & CASUALTY ) 
INSURANCE CO., a Utah corporation, ) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
DAVID E. ROSS II, ) 
Defendant. ) Civil No. C-8804644 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on 
for hearing before The Honorable Richard H. Moffat on December 4, 
1990, at 11:00 a.m. Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. was 
represented by Warren Patten and P. Bruce Badger of Fabian & 
Clendenin. The defendant, David Ross, was represented by Mark A. 
Larsen of Campbell, Maak and Sessions. 
The court heard argument of counsel and having consid-
ered the respective memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed by 
the parties and having found that there exist no genuine issues 
as to any material facts, that plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, and that the defendant has an adequate remedy 
at law, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
granted. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims for relief are granted. 
EXHIBIT A 
The defendant, David Ross, having delivered the stock certifi-
cates for his stock in Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 
Insurance Investment Co. and National Housing and Finance Syndi-
cate, Inc. to the escrow agent, is hereby deemed to have endorsed 
and unconditionally delivered said shares. Equitable Life & 
Casualty Insurance Company and the escrow agent are authorized to 
transfer said shares of stock upon the books of the corporation, 
as provided for in the Stock Purchase Agreement and Escrow Agree-
ment, both dated October 30, 1987. 
Furthermore, the defendant, David E. Ross, is deemed to 
have executed that General Release dated December 2, 1987, as 
required of him pursuant to paragraph 8 of the said Stock Pur-
chase Agreement. The General Release is effective as between 
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. and David E. Ross. 
2. Count I (Rescission) and Counts II-IV of Defen-
dant's Counterclaim insofar as they make a demand for rescission 
are dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The issue of plaintifffs claim for attorneys' fees 
and costs is reserved until a final adjudication of defendant's 
remaining claim for damages. 
- 2 -
DATED this I/ day of December 1990. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
P. Bruce Badger 
Attorney/for Plaintiff 
'sen 
Attorney for Defendant 
BY TJiE COURT yy 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of December 1990, 
I caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER, to: 
Mark A, Larsen, Esq. 
Campbell, Maak & Sessions 
170 South Main Street, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 /° /& ?/a*&-~ /-4u 
PBB:120490B 
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FltfDOISTBiCTCG^T 
Third Judicial District 
J A N - 8 1991 
Sy IN ylfV.Vu 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EQUITABLE 
INSURANCE 
v. 
DAVID E. 1 
LIFE & CASUALTY 
CO., a Utah corpo 
Plaintiff, 
ROSS II, 
Defendant. 
ration, ) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. C-8804644 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Defen-
dant's Motion for Reconsideration and for trial on December 17, 
1990 at 10:00 A.M. Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company 
was represented by Warren Patten and P. Bruce Badger, of Fabian & 
Clendenin. David E. Ross was represented by Mark LarsenF of 
Campbell, Maak & Sessions. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Immediately prior to trial the court heard argument on 
Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration, addressing the court's 
prior ruling on December 4, 1990, granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The defendant himself presented the 
argument in support of his motion. Mr. Badger argued for the 
Plaintiff. 
EXHIBIT B 
The court having heard argument and having considered 
Defendant's memorandum in support of its Motion for Reconsidera-
tion, and being otherwise fully advised, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Defendant's 
Motion For Reconsideration is denied, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Following the hearing on Defendant's Motion For Recon-
sideration the matter proceeded to trial. Because all of plain-
tiff's affirmative claims were adjudicated as a result of the 
court's ruling on December 4, 1990, granting Plaintiff's Motion 
For Partial Summary Judgment, which additionally dismissed all of 
defendant's demands for rescission, the only matter presented for 
trial was defendant's claim for damages. Consequently, Mr. 
Larsen on behalf of the defendant led off and presented his open-
ing statement. 
Following Mr. Larsen's opening statement, Mr. Patten, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, moved for dismissal of defendant's 
claims on the basis that the defendant's opening statement had 
demonstrated that the defendant was not entitled to the relief 
sought. The grounds for Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, presented 
by Mr. Patten as part of plaintiff's opening statement were that 
Jay Bell's letter, dated September 25, 1987 (defendant's Exhibit 
5), constituted an offer which was rejected by the Selling Group, 
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including the defendant; that the Selling Group, including defen-
dant, countered with its own offer on or about October 30, 1987 
(defendant's Exhibits 8, 9, 10), which was accepted by Equitable 
on or about November 4, 1987; and that the final agreement con-
tained no consulting contract, or any terms thereof, in favor of 
the defendant. 
Following Mr. Patten's opening statement, the Court 
permitted Mr. Larsen to present the defendant's argument in 
opposition. 
Defendant then moved for the admission of defendant's 
Exhibits 1-21 and for the publication of the deposition tran-
scripts for R. Earl Ross, Jay B. Bell and Roderick E. Ross. 
Plaintiff moved for the admission of plaintiff's Exhibits 1-44 
and the publication of the deposition transcripts for Daniel 
Jackson and David E. Ross II. No objections were made to these 
motions and all exhibits were received by the court and the tran-
scripts published. 
The defendant was then permitted to proffer his testi-
mony which was received without objection. 
The Court having considered argument of counsel, and 
defendant's proffer of testimony, and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises, 
- 3 -
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff's 
Motion to Dismiss is considered to be a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and is granted. Summary Judgment is entered in favor of the 
plaintiff as to all of defendant's remaining claims on the ground 
that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, that 
no consulting agreement exists between the plaintiff and defen-
dant, and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Plaintiff's claim for reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs as permitted by paragraph 11 of the Stock Purchase Agree-
ment (defendant's Exhibit 8), may be made upon affidavit. The 
defendant is entitled to a hearing on the matter of attorneys' 
fees and costs, if he so desires. 
This Summary Judgment, and all prior judgments entered 
in this action, shall become final upon the entry of a judgment 
on an award of plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 
DATED this A day of January, 1991. 
- 4 -
Approved as to Form: 
Warren Patten 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4#ark—Laj^en' 
Attor/p^y for Defendant 
PBB:122090A 
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Third Juoicia! Disir.ct 
APR 2 2 1991 
By «••!•> ^ yWlLu^jUi 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
EQUITABLE LIFE & CASUALTY ) 
INSURANCE CO., a Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
DAVID E. ROSS II, ) 
Defendant. ) 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment on Award of Attorneys' 
Fees came on for hearing before The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
on April 1, 1991, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by 
Warren Patten and P. Bruce Badger. Defendant was represented by 
Mark A. Larsen. The court having heard argument of counsel and 
having considered the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel with item-
ized billing statements filed pursuant to Rule 4-505 of the Rules 
of Judicial Administration, and defendant's memorandum in opposi-
tion, and affidavits, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, finds, consistent with the court's Minute Entry dated 
April 5, 1991, that plaintiffs had a contractual right to an 
award of attorneys' fees based on paragraph 11 of the Stock Pur-
chase Agreement, defendant's Exhibit "8"; that plaintiff's attor-
ney's affidavit was appropriately filed pursuant to Rule 4-505 of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration and conforms to the rule; 
COURT 
OF UTAH 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-8804644 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
EXHIBIT C 
that plaintiff is entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees 
incurred in prosecuting and defending all claims in this action; 
and that plaintiff's attorneys' fees reflected in the itemized 
affidavit of plaintiff's attorneys are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. Therefore, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that plaintiff's Motion 
for Judgment on Awar Attorneys' Fees is granted. 
JUDGMENT 
The clerk is hereby directed to enter judgment in favor 
of plaintiff Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company and 
against David E. Ross, II, in the amount of $38,750.13 for attor-
neys' fees and $2,474.04 for costs, for a t tal judgment of 
$41,224.17. 
All matters having now been concluded, the court deter-
mines that there is no just reason to delay entry <?f a final 
judgment. Therefore, the court expressly directs that the judg-
ment be entered as a Final Judgment and that all judgments on the 
merits previously entered ijaf this case are now final. 
DATED this-22 day of April 1991. 
- 2 -
fat 
t Judge 
